Marcuse argues that “the traditional notion of the ‘neutrality’ of technology can no longer be maintained.” Here is a claim that runs through his whole critique of technology. Yet, in reality, his rejection of the neutrality thesis is by no means so categorical as it seems. What is the traditional notion of the neutrality of technology, and with what new conception does he propose to replace it?
The neutrality of technology consists, first of all, in its “value-free” indifference to the variety of ends it can be made to serve. As means, technologies stand under the norm of efficiency and are only contingently related to the substantive values that determine their applications. This is the meaning of the infamous slogan of the NRA according to which “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” This conception of neutrality is familiar and self-evident.
There is a second sense in which technology is said to be neutral. Not only is technology claimed to be indifferent with respect to ends, but it also appears to be indifferent with respect to social organization, at least in modern times, and especially with respect to the political distinction between capitalist and socialist society.1 A hammer is a hammer, a steam turbine is a steam turbine, and such tools are useful in any social context, assuming the existence of a suitable technical infrastructure to support their employment. In this respect, technology appears to be different from legal or religious institutions, which cannot be easily transferred to new social contexts, because they are so deeply embedded in the culture of their society of origin. The transfer of technology, on the contrary, seems to be inhibited only by cost.
Third, the cultural neutrality of technology is usually attributed to its “rational” character and to the universality of the truth it embodies. That truth, like scientific truth, can be formulated in verifiable causal propositions that maintain their validity in every conceivable cultural context.
Fourth, the rational universality of technology also makes it possible to apply the same standards of measurement to technologies employed in different settings. Thus, the progress of technology is routinely said to increase the productivity of labor and social wealth in comparisons not only between different countries but also between different eras and different types of societies.
In opposition to these widely accepted views, Marcuse asserts that technology is fundamentally biased toward domination. His alternative position can be formulated in three theses, each of which summarizes an aspect of his argument:
1) Technology in advanced capitalism has become a total system, a world. It takes the place traditionally occupied by ideology in legitimating capitalist society. It thereby forecloses opposition to the wrongs of the society and perpetuates the domination inherited from the past.
2) Technology and its associated technical rationality are not politically neutral, because, even as they serve generic ends such as increasing the productivity of labor, their specific design and application under capitalism imposes top-down control in production and social life generally. In this sense, the means (technology) are not truly “value free” but can be said to include within their structure the end of controlling the labor force.
3) Scientific-technical rationality is a priori adapted to the maintenance of social domination.
These three theses contradict the commonsense notion of the neutrality of technology. Marcuse insists on linking means and ends, denies that technology is indifferent with respect to the alternative of capitalism or socialism, and challenges the apparent value-freedom of scientific-technical rationality.
Yet, he also insists on the possibility of a transition to socialism based on the reconstruction of existing technology. This prospect implies the neutrality of technology, albeit a different notion from the usual one. But what kind of neutrality would be compatible with Marcuse’s claim that capitalist technology serves domination? Is this not a contradiction in terms? Or can neutrality and bias coexist?
Bibliografia:
The qualification “modern” is necessary since modern technology is by no means culturally indifferent in premodern contexts. See Lauriston Sharp, “Steel Axes for Stone Age Australians,” in Human Problems in Technological Change, ed. Edward H. Spicer (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952). ↩