ROJCEWICZ, Richard. The Gods and Technology. A Reading of Heidegger. New York: SUNY, 2006
From Socrates on, in Heidegger’s eyes, there has been a “falling away” from the great original outlook, a forswearing of the attitude that led to the view of truth as a goddess, and so the entirety of the intervening history basically amounts to Ab-fall, apostasy (P, 79/54). For Heidegger, this apostasy has culminated in metaphysics, humanism, and modern technology, and for him, as we will see, these are all in essence exactly the same. They are merely different expressions of the same human chauvinism. They all understand the human being in terms of subjectivity and in particular as the subject, the sovereign subject.
For example, metaphysics defines the human being as zoon logon echon, “the animal possessing language.” Heidegger’s quarrel here is not primarily over the words zoon and logos. Those terms do signify something essential, namely that humans are unique among living beings in enjoying an understanding of what it means to be in general. This understanding is especially manifest in the use of language, inasmuch as words are general expressions; they express universals, concepts, essences, the Being of things. Thus to be able to speak is a sign that one is in touch with the realm of Being or, in other words, that one is “in the truth.” To that extent, the metaphysical definition points to something valid and is unobjectionable. The definition goes further, however, and in Heidegger’s eyes it does not simply make the observation that humans enjoy a relation to truth but also stipulates that relation as one of “possessing.” Now that is objectionable to Heidegger, and so his criticism bears on what, to all appearances, is an utterly innocuous word in the definition, echon, “possess.”
To possess is to be the subject, the owner, the master. Heidegger’s concern here is not that the metaphysical definition implies humans are in complete possession of the truth; it does not imply that at all. But the definition indeed intends to say that humans are the subjects of whatever truth they do possess. Humans are the possessors of language in the sense that the understanding of the essence of things, and the expression of essences in words, are human accomplishments. Humans have wrested this understanding; it is a result of their own research and insight. Humans are then, as it were, in control as regards the disclosure of truth; humans are the subjects, the agents, the main protagonists, of the disclosure. That is the characteristic stance of metaphysics; metaphysics makes the human being the subject. In other words, the human being is the subject of metaphysics: again, not in the sense of the subject matter, but in the sense of the agent of metaphysics, that which by its own powers accomplishes metaphysics, wrests the disclosure of truth or Being.
From a Heideggerian perspective, the “possessing” spoken of in the metaphysical definition ought to be turned around. Accordingly, Heidegger reverses the formula expressing the essence of a human being: from zoon logon echon to logos anthropon echon (EM, 184/137), from humans possessing language to language possessing humans. Humans are not the sovereign possessors, not the subjects of metaphysics, not the primary dis-closers of truth. Instead, humans are the ones to whom truth is disclosed. Referring to the metaphysical definition, Heidegger asks: “Is language something that comes at all under the discretionary power of man? Is language a sheer human accomplishment? Is man a being that possesses language as one of his belongings? Or is it language that ‘possesses’ man and man belongs to language, inasmuch as language first discloses the world to man and thereby [prepares] man’s dwelling in this world?” (PT, 74-5/59)
The attitude motivating these questions is the pre-Socratic one whereby the gods (or, equivalently, truth, Being, language, the essence of things in general) hold sway over human subjectivity. The full sense of this holding sway is a nuanced one and will emerge in the course of our study of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It is certain at least that Heidegger does not merely reverse the direction of the “possessing” while leaving its sense of mastery or domination intact. Nevertheless, for Heidegger, the human powers of disclosure are indeed appropriated by something ascendant over them, something which discloses itself to humans — or which hesitates to do so. Thus Heidegger makes it clear that the apostasy he finds in history is not human apostasy; it is not a matter of human failing. Humans are not the ultimate subjects of this apostasy; they are not the apostates, the gods are. That is to say, humans have not forsaken the beginning, so much as the beginning has forsaken humans. Humans have not foresworn the gods; on the contrary, the gods have on their own absconded from us. Humans have not been unobservant or careless in their pursuit of the truth; instead, the truth has drawn over itself a more impenetrable veil. Humans do now speak superficially, but not because they have been negligent, have neglected to preserve the strong sense of words; on the contrary, language itself has emasculated the terms in which it speaks to us. Most generally, humans have not overlooked Being, so much as Being has become increasingly reticent in showing itself.
These inverted views are altogether characteristic of Heidegger’s philosophy, especially in its later period. His philosophy cannot then but seem countersensical or mystical to someone in the metaphysical tradition. For Heidegger, the human being is not the subject of metaphysics. The prime movers of metaphysics, the main protagonists of the disclosure of what it means to be in general, are the gods or, to speak less metaphorically, Being itself. Since metaphysics and modern technology are essentially the same, we will see that for Heidegger humans are not the subjects of this technology either; the gods are the prime movers of modern technology and indeed of all technology. Technology is not merely, and not even primarily, a human accomplishment.
If humans are, in some way, possessed by language, led to the truth, if they are primarily the receivers rather than the agents of the disclosure of Being, that does nevertheless of course not mean for Heidegger that humans are sheer receivers, utterly passive recipients. Humans do not receive the self-offering of the gods the way softened wax receives the impress of a stamp. Humans make an active contribution to the disclosure of the meaning of Being. Humans co-constitute that disclosure and are co-responsible for it. Humans are therefore called upon to exercise all their disclosive powers; humans must be sensitive, thoughtful, creative, resolute. There is no disclosure of truth without a human contribution, and the genuineness of the disclosure depends to some necessary extent upon that contribution. In other words, truth, the goddess, may take the thinker by the hand, but the thinker must actually be a thinker, must actively attempt to disclose the truth, must, as it were, reach out a hand toward the truth for the goddess to take up.
Heidegger never loses sight of the necessary and necessarily active role humans play in the disclosure of the meaning of Being. Nevertheless, for him the human role remains ancillary, and the primary actor, the primary agent of the disclosure of truth, is Being itself. The proper human role is therefore not to wrest a disclosure of Being but to abet Being’s own self-disclosure. Humans are not the prime movers, and neither are they merely, passively, the moved. Humans are, rather, something like shepherds or, perhaps better, midwives; they play a creative role within a more general context of receptivity. Heidegger attempts to express this role in the name he proposes as the proper one for humans, when viewed specifically with respect to the disclosure of Being. That name is not “possessor,” but Dasein.