Heidegger’s criticism of the tendency of modern technology to treat the earth as a machine or as raw material for exploitation has led some people to interpret his thinking as being consistent with contemporary environmentalism. In this section, I want to examine briefly the extent to which Heidegger’s thought may be “applied” to the environmental movement called “deep ecology.”
The consequences of treating the earth as a machine, or as an infinitely exploitable commodity, have become increasingly clear in the form of acid rain, polluted rivers and lakes, the “greenhouse effect,” deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, thinning of the ozone layer, mass extinction of species, and a myriad of other environmental problems. Environmental reformers want to curb the destructive practices of industrialism in order to prevent the collapse of the biosphere and, thereby, to save humanity from a form of suicide. Those who call themselves “deep ecologists,” however, maintain that reformism will succeed only in postponing the inevitable catastrophe. Deep ecology is “deep” in that it asks deeper questions about the origins of our ecological crisis. Deep ecologists agree that the real explanation for the environmental crisis is the radically anthropocentric character of Western culture. Such anthropocentrism stems from at least two sources, including Christianity and Greek philosophy.
In a famous essay, Lynn White, Jr. called Christianity “the most anthropocentric religion the world has known” because it overemphasizes the importance of humans in creation, while downplaying the glory of the rest of the creation. Important strands of Greek philosophy, especially its Stoic offshoots, also promoted the idea that humans are at the top of the “great chain of being” and that therefore all other things are for man’s use. The integration of Christian theology and Greek metaphysics helped to make possible the scientific revolution. Centuries later, Francis Bacon championed the view that scientific knowledge made it possible for man to gain power over nature. Descartes’s division of reality into thinking minds and extended matter promoted the dualism which stripped the natural world of beauty and intrinsic value. Later, the Enlightenment proclaimed that rationality would make possible a utopian life for humanity, by making possible not only the conquest of nature but also the reorganization of human society. The application of scientific findings to industrial processes enabled Enlightenment ideologies including capitalism and later socialism to initiate the extraordinary global industrialization process that has wreaked such havoc on the natural environment, as well as on many aspects of human society.
Hence, for deep ecologists the real roots of our ecological crisis lie in the anthropocentric humanism which portrays all non-human entities as raw materials that are useful in enhancing human projects. Deep ecologists argue that only if humanity overcomes its anthropocentric bias and moves toward a position of biocentric egalitarianism will it be possible to avoid environmental catastrophe. Only by learning to love and to respect all things, not only people, will humanity develop the alternative technologies and the simpler ways of life necessary to preserve the planet from the dire consequences of unchecked population growth and rampant industrialism, not to mention the nuclear holocaust that may result when the two superpowers go to war over whose version of “humanism” Marxism or capitalism will prevail.
In light of our examination of Heidegger’s critique of the anthropocentric humanism so central to modern technology, the reader will readily notice the significant similarities between the deep ecological and the Heideggerean accounts of Western history. Inspired by such similarities, a French environmental theorist has asked: “In the final accounting, will Heidegger have been the first theoretician in the ecological struggle?” As I have argued in detail elsewhere, Heidegger’s critique of anthropocentric humanism, his call for humanity to learn to “let things be,” his notion that humanity is involved in a “play” or “dance” with earth, sky, and gods, his meditation on the possibility of an authentic mode of “dwelling” on the earth, his complaint that industrial technology is laying waste to the earth, his emphasis on the importance of local place and “homeland,’’ his claim that humanity should guard and preserve things, instead of dominating them all these aspects of Heidegger’s thought help to support the claim that he is a major deep ecological theorist.
While it is tempting to “apply” Heidegger’s thought in this way, there are several problems which should give deep ecologists pause before they adopt Heidegger as one of their own. These problems include (1) residual anthropocentrism, (2) the reactionary dimension to his critique of industrialism and modernity, and (3) his antipathy toward science. Earlier in this essay, we noted that despite his critique of anthropocentric humanism, Heidegger remained part of the Western tradition insofar as he regarded humanity as radically other than all other things. Early Heidegger in particular emphasized that human Dasein is essentially different from all other things. Not only different but also more important: other things can manifest themselves and thus “be” only insofar as human Dasein constitutes the clearing in which that manifesting can occur. Later Heidegger tried to temper this anthropocentrism, but not by integrating humanity into what deep ecologists regard as the “seamless web” of life. Recall that Heidegger was a severe critic of all “naturalism,” of which he might have regarded deep ecology as a spiritually elevated but nevertheless misguided example. Instead of overcoming anthropocentrism by integrating humanity into the natural nexus, Heidegger overcame it by saying that humanity is not autonomous and central, but instead exists in the service of what transcends all entities: being as such.
Second, deep ecologists must examine seriously the implications of Heidegger’s` involvement with National Socialism. His willingness to support an authoritarian regime to “solve” the problems posed by modernity and industrialism, the ease with which he abandoned the principles of respect for the rights of others, his talk about a mystical “union” between Volk and earth, and his hierarchical views about those “gifted” with insight about the meaning of history all this must give pause to those deep ecologists, most of whom recognize that authoritarianism, hierarchism, and communitarianism without respect for individual freedom are by no means “solutions” to the environmental crisis, but instead are important causes for it. Heidegger may be defended from the charge of racism, for he rejected Nazi prattle about “blood ties” with the land. But this defense is not of much help for those concerned to use Heidegger in support of deep ecology. Deep ecologists want to be able to speak about the organic relatedness of all life on earth without being accused of reverting to fascist mythologizing. Heidegger “solved” this problem by redefining “rootedness in the earth” in a way that virtually eliminated the organic dimension of this notion. But deep ecologists rightly hesitate to adopt this solution, since they have a more positive, less suspicious view of the organic domain than did Heidegger, who was such an enemy of all “naturalism.”
Heidegger’s suspicion of naturalism leads us to the third problem regarding the Heidegger-deep ecology relation. Deep ecologists portray humanity as a highly intelligent animal which has arisen by virtue of billions of years of terrestrial evolution. According to deep ecologists, only by understanding the extent to which human life is inextricably involved with other forms of life, and indeed with virtually all the processes organic and inorganic taking place on earth, can humanity understand that by destroying the planet, humanity is destroying itself. The science of ecology, despite being to some extent implicated in the scientific view of all things as mere “objects,” is regarded by deep ecologists as a basic source of information concerning how to structure an appropriate mode of human “dwelling” on earth. Attempts by humans to deny their animal origins and their dependence on the rest of life have led, in the view of deep ecologists, precisely to that arrogant anthropocentric humanism which treats all non-human life merely as a commodity for human ends. Insofar as Heidegger refused to take seriously the organic dimension of human existence, he may well be accused of having remained in a curious way tied to the human-centered, dualistic metaphysical tradition of which he was so critical.
Keeping in mind these significant caveats, I believe that Heidegger’s writings offer much food for thought regarding the environmental crisis. Whether we finally accept or reject his analyses of Western history and his alternative to it, the process of arriving at such an evaluation will have forced us to examine critically the undeniably anthropocentric attitude of much of Western history and culture. Perhaps elements of Heidegger’s notion of a “higher humanism” can contribute to the quest by deep ecologists to define humanity anew. The key here may be Heidegger’s conception of human existence as “care.” Arne Naess, one of the leading figures in deep ecology, seems to echo this conception when he says of humanity: “Up to this point, we know of no other life form in the universe whose nature is such that, under favorable circumstances, it more or less inevitably would develop a broad and deep concern for life conditions in general.” For both Naess and Heidegger, humanity becomes what it truly is only when it learns to let other entities “be’’ what they are. In such caring, humanity becomes what it most authentically can be.